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Blind quantum computation (BQC) enables a client without enough quantum power to delegate
his quantum computation to a quantum server, while keeping the input data, the algorithm and
the result unknown to the server. In the studies of practical BQC protocol, an important problem
is how to reduce the quantum requirement of the client. Multi-server BQC protocols have been
proposed to solve this problem. We review the double-server and triple-server protocols [Li et al.,
Phys. Rev. A 89, 040302(R) (2014)], and propose a modified double-server BQC protocol with a
trusted center. In our protocol, the servers are allowed to communicate mutually, and the client is
completely classical. Furthermore, our double-server protocol can be modified into a single-server
protocol by simply combining the two servers. Compared with the triple-server protocol, our double-
server and single-server protocols are more simple and the client is not required to have the ability
to access quantum channel. So our protocols are more practical when quantum computer is applied
in the ‘cloud’ model.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Lx
I. INTRODUCTION
Blind quantum computation (BQC) is a kind of se-
cure computation protocol involving two roles, where the
client has the data and the algorithm, and the server has
a quantum computer. In BQC protocol, the client in-
structs the server to perform quantum computation on
his data without leaking any information about the data,
the algorithm and even the final result. BQC protocol
should have the properties of blindness, correctness and
verifiability. The blindness means that the data, the al-
gorithm and the result are only known by the client; the
correctness means that the client can obtain the correct
outcome after the protocol being finished; the verifiabil-
ity means that the client can check whether the server
performs the computation following his instructions.
The research of BQC protocol begins from Ref.[1],
which construct some BQC protocols for each of the ba-
sic quantum gates (Hadamard gate, CNOT gate, and pi/8
gate). Because any quantum circuit can be implemented
by a combination of these basic gates, the BQC proto-
col can implement any quantum circuit. However, this
protocol does not satisfy the requirement of verifiability.
Arrighi and Salvail [2] proposed another BQC protocol,
which is not universal since it is only used for computing
some classical functions. Based on quantum authentica-
tion scheme, Aharonov et al. [3] proposed an interactive
proof system for quantum computation, which can also
be used as a BQC protocol. However, the client must
perform lots of quantum computation in the quantum
authentication encoding. Based on measurement-based
quantum computation model, Broadbent et al. [4] pro-
posed the first universal BQC protocol, in which the
client only needs to prepare some single-qubit states.
Currently, lots of researches have been proposed to make
∗ liangmin07@mails.ucas.ac.cn
the BQC protocols more optimal or practical [5–10]. For
example, Ref.[6] improved the fault-tolerant threshold for
BQC by topological quantum computation, and Ref.[11]
studied the optimization of the BQC protocol from the
aspect of quantum communication.
All the mentioned protocols are single-server BQC pro-
tocols, in which the client must have some quantum abil-
ities, such as the ability to prepare or measure single
qubit [4, 12]. An important effort in the researches of
practical BQC protocol is reducing the quantum require-
ment of the client. If the client is limited to only be able
to carry out classical computation, we have to increase
the number of the servers and devise the multi-server
BQC protocols. Actually, Broadbent et al.[4] proposed
a double-server protocol, where the client is completely
classical and the two servers cannot communicate mu-
tually. The double-server protocols in Ref.[7, 13] also
assume the noncommunicating of the two servers. Later,
Li et al.[14] proposed a triple-server BQC protocol, in
which the client is almost classical (the client can only
access the quantum channel) and the servers are allowed
to communicate with each other.
We review and analyze the main multi-server BQC pro-
tocols, and devise a double-server BQC protocol with
completely classical client, where the two servers are al-
lowed to communicate mutually. In our protocol, the
trusted center should prepare Bell states and send them
to the servers. In addition, it is necessary that there ex-
ists a private classical channel from the trusted center to
the client.
II. REVIEWS AND ANALYSIS
Before introducing our double-server BQC protocol, we
review the single-server BQC protocol and double-server
BQC protocol in Ref.[4], the modified double-sever BQC
protocol in Ref.[13], and the triple-server BQC protocol
in Ref.[14].
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2Let the set S =
{
0, pi4 ,
2pi
4 , . . . ,
7pi
4
}
, and φ ∈r S means
φ is randomly chosen from the set S. The notation |±φ〉
denotes the qubit |0〉 ± eiφ|1〉.
A. BFK single-server protocol
Client wants to finish a quantum computation. As-
sume he has in mind the quantum computation on the
n-qubit graph state corresponding to the graph G. The
quantum operation that Client wants to perform is to
measure the ith qubit in the basis {| ± φi〉}.
S1: Client prepares n qubits and sends them to Server.
The state of each qubit is |θi〉 = |0〉 + eiθi |1〉(i =
1, 2, . . . , n), where θi is uniformly chosen from the
set S.
S2: Server produces the brickwork state |G(θ)〉 by apply-
ing controlled-Z gates on the received qubits based
on the graph G.
S3: For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, Client randomly chooses ri ∈
{0, 1} and computes δi = (θi + φ′i + ripi)mod2pi,
where φ′i is obtained according to the previous mea-
surements and φi, and then δi is sent to Server
if Client needs Server to measure the ith qubit of
|G(θ)〉.
S4: Server performs a measurement on the ith (i =
1, 2, . . . , n) qubit in the basis {| ± δi〉} and informs
Client about the measurement result.
This single-server BQC protocol can be modified to
be a BQC protocol with authentication where a cheating
server can be found with probability exponentially ap-
proaching one [4]. All the protocols that are introduced
in this article do not have the property of authentication,
however, they can also be modified to be a BQC protocol
with authentication in the similar way. More details can
be found in Ref.[4]. We do not discuss the authentication
here.
Notice that there is no explicit input in the protocol.
In fact, the preparation of the initial input state can be
included in the algorithm of quantum computation. For
example, in the steps S3 and S4, Client can instruct
Server to prepare the input state and perform the quan-
tum computation on the state. Obviously, the input state
is still unknown to Server.
B. Double-server BQC protocols
Broadbent et al.[4] point out an important problem:
does there exist a BQC protocol which permits a com-
pletely classical client? They present a solution which is
based on two entangled servers; However, the two servers
are not allowed to communicate with each other. In the
following, we firstly review this double-server BQC pro-
tocol [4] (it is named BFK double-server protocol in this
article), and then introduce a modified version [13].
Bell states are used in the protocols. The Bell state of
a pair of particles (a, b) can be denoted by |ϕx,z(a, b)〉 =
(I ⊗XxZz) 1√
2
(|00〉a,b + |11〉a,b), where x, z ∈ {0, 1}.
Initialization: The trusted center distributes
Bell states to Server1 and Server2.
The trusted center prepares n Bell states |ϕ0,0(Ai, Bi)〉
(i = 1, . . . , n). He sends the n particles A1, . . . , An to
Server1, and sends the n particles B1, . . . , Bn to Server2.
Stage 1: Client’s preparation with Server1
D1-1: Client independently chooses n random values
θ˜i ∈r S (i = 1, . . . , n), and sends them to Server1;
D1-2: According to the n bases {| ± θ˜i〉}ni=1, Server1
performs quantum measurements on his particles
A1, . . . , An and obtains n bits, which are denoted
as {mi}ni=1. Then he sends these bits to Client.
Stage 2: Client’s computation with Server2
D2-1: Similar to S2, Server2 produces the brickwork
state using all his qubits;
D2-2: Client starts the BFK single-server BQC protocol
with Server2 from the step S3, replacing θi with
θ˜i +mipi (i = 1, . . . , n).
In this double-server BQC protocol, Client is only re-
quired to do classical computation, and the two servers
are not allowed to communicate with each other. It
is worth to notice that, the information {θ˜i}ni=1 and
{mi}ni=1 should be transmitted through a private chan-
nel (for example, a secure encryption algorithm is used)
between Client and Server1; Otherwise, Server2 may ob-
tain the values of {θi}ni=1 and break the blindness of the
protocol.
A modified version of the above double-server BQC
protocol is proposed by Morimae and Fujii in Ref.[13].
They present a secure entanglement distillation scheme
for the double-server BQC protocol. Ref.[15] gives out a
better entanglement distillation scheme with higher effi-
ciency. We briefly review Morimae and Fujii’s protocol
without entanglement distillation as follows.
Initialization: The trusted center distributes
Bell states |ϕxi,zi(Ai, Bi)〉 to Server1 and Server2,
where xi, zi are known by Client and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Stage 1: Client’s preparation with Server1
M1-1: Client independently chooses n random values
{θ˜i ∈r S}ni=1, and sends the messages {θ˜′i =
(−1)xi θ˜i + zipi}ni=1 to Server1;
M1-2: According to the n bases {| ± θ˜′i〉}ni=1, Server1
performs quantum measurements on his particles
A1, . . . , An, and obtains n bits {mi}ni=1; Then he
sends these bits to Client.
Stage 2: Client’s computation with Server2
3M2-1: Same as D2-1.
M2-2: Same as D2-2.
The above protocol is an improved version of BFK
double-server BQC protocol. In the BFK double-server
BQC protocol, the shared entanglement between the two
servers is 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), and Server1 performs quantum
measurement on the first particle according to the basis
| ± θ˜i〉; In the modified version, the shared entanglement
between the two servers is (I ⊗XxiZzi) 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉),
and Server1 performs quantum measurement on the first
particle according to the basis | ± ((−1)xi θ˜i + zipi)〉. Ac-
tually, they are equivalent since the measurement out-
come of the particle a in |ϕxi,zi(a, b)〉 according to the
basis | ± ((−1)xi θ˜i + zipi)〉 is equal to the measurement
outcome of the particle a in |ϕ0,0(a, b)〉 according to the
basis | ± θ˜i〉.
C. Triple-server BQC protocol
In the reviewed double-server protocols, the two
servers are not allowed to communicate with each other.
It is unrealistic to forbid two quantum servers to com-
municate mutually. So, the researchers try to solve
this problem. Based on entanglement swapping and the
above modified protocol, Li et al.[14] devised a triple-
server BQC protocol in which the three quantum servers
can communicate mutually. However, the client is not
completely classical, and must have the ability to access
the quantum channel. The protocol has the following
four stages.
Initialization: The trusted center distributes
Bell states to Server1, Server2 and Client.
T0-1: The trusted center produces n = (2 + δ)m Bell
states |ϕ0,0(Ai, B1i)〉 (i = 1, . . . , n). He sends the
n particles A1, . . . , An to Client, and sends the n
particles B11, . . . , B1n to Server1.
T0-2: The trusted center produces n Bell states
|ϕ0,0(A′i, B2i)〉 (i = 1, . . . , n). He sends the n parti-
cles A′1, . . . , A
′
n to Client, and sends the n particles
B21, . . . , B2n to Server2.
Stage 1: Client’s preparation with Server3
T1-1: For each particle Ak or A
′
l arriving, Client ran-
domly chooses one of the two choices: (a) discard-
ing it, or (b) transmitting it to Server3 and record-
ing its position.
T1-2: Server3 may receive 2m particles from Client,
where the m particles that are entangled with
Server1 are denoted as As1 , . . . , Asm , and m par-
ticles that are entangled with Server2 are denoted
as A′t1 , . . . , A
′
tm . Server3 performs Bell measure-
ment on the m pairs of particles {(Asi , A′ti)}mi=1,
and sends the result {(xi, zi)}mi=1 to Client.
Stage 2: Client’s preparation with Server1
T2-1: Client chooses n values {θ˜i}ni=1 and sends the val-
ues of {θ˜′i = (−1)xi θ˜i + zipi}ni=1 to Server1. {θ˜′i}ni=1
are distributed as uniformly as possible over all the
eight elements of the set S.
T2-2: According to the bases {| ± θ˜′i〉}ni=1, Server1 per-
forms quantum measurements on the n particles
B11, . . . , B1n, and sends the result {mi}ni=1 to
Client. Client only keeps the values of {msi}mi=1.
Stage 3: Client’s computation with Server2
T3-1: Client asks Server2 to keep the m qubits which
are labeled as {ti}mi=1. Notice that the m qubits
can be represented as {|θ˜si+msipi〉}mi=1 at this time.
Similar to S2, Server2 produces the brickwork state
using the m qubits.
T3-2: Client starts the reviewed single-server BQC pro-
tocol with Server2 from the step S3, replacing θi
with θ˜si +msipi (i = 1, . . . ,m).
Compared with Morimae and Fujii’s double-server
BQC protocol [13], the above protocol has added an-
other quantum server Server3. Actually, for the re-
ceived particles, he just performs some Bell measure-
ments on these particles. If the ith measurement result
is (xi, zi), Client can know the entanglement has been es-
tablished between Server1’s particle B1si and Server2’s
particle B2ti , and the combined state of B1si and B2ti is
|ϕxi,zi(B1si , B2ti)〉. Then, Client starts the interactive
procedure with Server1 and Server2 that are similar to
Morimae and Fujii’s double-server protocol.
In the triple-server protocol, the three servers are al-
lowed to communicate mutually, and can be modified to
be a single-server BQC protocol, in which the client is
also an almost classical user. More details can be found
in Ref.[16]. Recently, Ref.[17] points out a security loop-
hole in both this triple-server protocol and the single-
server protocol in Ref.[16]
III. BLIND QUANTUM COMPUTATION WITH
COMPLETELY CLASSICAL CLIENT
Generally, single-server BQC protocols require the
client to have some quantum ability, such as the abil-
ity to produce single-qubit states or make quantum mea-
surements. If the client can only perform classical com-
putation, the BQC protocols require at least two quan-
tum servers. For example, the double-server BQC pro-
tocol in Ref.[4] only requires the client to have a classi-
cal computer. However, all the double-server protocols
[4, 7, 13] assume the servers cannot communicate mu-
tually. Ref.[14] proposes a triple-server BQC protocl, in
which the three servers are allowed to communicate mu-
tually. However, the client is almost classical because he
needs to access quantum channel.
4In this section, we will propose a new modified double-
server BQC protocol, which allows a completely classi-
cal client and the two servers are allowed to communi-
cate mutually. In our protocol, the client and the servers
are connected by the bidirectional classical channels, and
there exists an unidirectional classical channel from the
trusted center to the client. There are an unidirectional
quantum channel from the trusted center to each server.
See Figure.1.
FIG. 1. The diagram of our modified double-server BQC
protocol. In the diagram, ‘CC’ and ‘QC’ represent the clas-
sical channel and the quantum channel, respectively. The
trusted center and each server are connected by an unidirec-
tional quantum channel. The trusted center and the client are
connected by an unidirectional classical channel. The client
and each server are connected by the bidirectional classical
channel.
The protocol has the following three stages: Initializa-
tion, Stage 1 and Stage 2.
Initialization: The trusted center distributes
Bell states to Server1 and Server2, and sends clas-
sical secret information to Client.
P0-1: The trusted center randomly chooses n pairs of
bits {(xi, zi)}ni=1 and a n-ary permutation P , and
sends them to Client through the classical channel
in a secure way;
P0-2: The trusted center prepares n Bell states
|ϕxi,zi(Ai, Bi)〉, i = 1, ..., n, and sends the parti-
cles A1, . . . , An to Server1 in sequence. Then he
sends the particles BP−1(1), . . . , BP−1(n) to Server2
in the order which depends on the permutation P .
Stage 1: Client’s preparation with Server1
P1-1: Client independently chooses n random values
{θ˜i}ni=1 from the set S, and sends the values of
{θ˜′i = (−1)xi θ˜i + zipi mod2pi}ni=1 to Server1;
P1-2: According to the n bases {|± θ˜′i〉}ni=1, Server1 per-
forms quantum measurements on the n particles
{Ai}ni=1 and obtains n bits. Denotes the n bits as
{mi}ni=1. He sends these bits to Client.
Stage 2: Client’s computation with Server2
P2-1: Similar to S2, Server2 produces the brickwork
state using the n particles BP−1(1), . . . , BP−1(n).
P2-2: Client starts the BFK single-server BQC protocol
with Server2 from the step S3, replacing θi with
θ˜P−1(i) + mP−1(i)pi (or let θP (i) = θ˜i + mipi), i =
1, . . . , n.
According to the step P2-2, it is obvious that Client
can run the correct single-server blind quantum compu-
tation with Server2.
Next, we show that the above modified double-server
BQC protocol is secure even if the two servers communi-
cate mutually.
Suppose Server1 and Server2 can communicate with
each other, they may cooperate and attempt to obtain
the information related to Client’s quantum computa-
tion, such as something about {θi}ni=1 or {φi}ni=1. As-
sume that Server2 who knows {δi}ni=1 is chosen to do such
thing. Server1 tells his information {θ˜′i}ni=1 and {mi}ni=1
to Server2. Server2 still cannot learn anything about
{θi}ni=1 or {φi}ni=1. The analysis is as follows.
1. Server2 cannot know the values of {(xi, zi)}ni=1 and
the permutation P since they are Client’s secret in-
formation which are transmitted from the trusted
center through a secure channel. Though the Bell
measurement on the pair of particles (Ai, Bi) can
result the values of xi and zi, Server2 cannot know
which particle is Bi since the order of the parti-
cles {Bi}ni=1 has been rearranged by the unknown
permutation P .
2. Without the knowledge of {(xi, zi)}ni=1, it is impos-
sible for Server2 to compute the values of {θ˜i}ni=1
from {θ˜′i}ni=1.
3. Even if Server2 had gained the information about
{θ˜i}ni=1, he still cannot know the values of {θi}ni=1
since he does not know the random permutation P .
4. From Server2’s information {δi}ni=1, he cannot ob-
tain any information about {φi}ni=1 without the
knowledge of {θi}ni=1.
Compared with the case that the servers communicate
mutually, less information can be known by each server
when the servers do not communicate mutually. Thus,
our protocol is also secure if the two servers do not com-
municate with each other. Notice that the reviewed BFK
double-server BQC protocol [4] is just a special case of
our protocol: let all of {(xi, zi)}ni=1 be zeroes, and P be
the identity permutation.
According to Ref.[17], the triple-server protocol [14]
suffers from two kinds of attacks, which can gain the po-
sitions {si, ti}mi=1. The fundamental cause lies in that the
positions are determined during the interactive process.
However, in our protocol, the positions are decided by the
permutation P , which has been chosen randomly before
5the interactive process. The two attacks are ineffective
for our protocol.
In our double-server BQC protocol, the servers are al-
lowed to communicate mutually. If the two servers are
joined together (the steps of Server1 and Server2 are fin-
ished by one server), we can get a single-server BQC pro-
tocol. It is obvious that the single-server protocol is as
secure as our double-server protocol.
Compared with the triple-server protocol [14], the
client here is completely classical; However, the client
in the triple-server protocol must have the ability to ac-
cess quantum channel, such as the ability to receive and
forward the qubits.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
In our protocol, there needs a secure classical channel
between the trusted center and the client. This channel
can be ensured by certain cryptosystem (block cipher or
public-key encryption) in modern cryptography. More-
over, it can also be ensured by ‘QKD+OTP’ (quantum
key distribution [18] plus one-time pad). If the latter is
chosen to protect the classical channel, the client is re-
quired to finish the procedure of QKD. We should stress
that, our BQC protocol itself does not require the client’s
quantum ability.
In our protocol, the client is completely classical, then
its output is also completely classical. It is worth to
notice the following two points. Firstly, the input of the
computation can be a quantum state. Though the client
cannot send quantum input to the servers directly, his
quantum input can be generated during the process of
quantum computation. Secondly, the client delegates the
quantum computation to the quantum servers, so the
computation is a quantum algorithm. For example, the
client cannot perform Shor’s quantum algorithm [19], but
he can finish the algorithm through the interaction with
the quantum servers.
Our protocols (double-server protocol and single-server
protocol) are very practical while being applied in the
cloud quantum computation. In our protocols, the client
is completely classical and no quantum channel is needed
between the client and the servers. So the widely used
classical computers and communication network can sat-
isfy the client’s requirement in the implementation of
cloud quantum computation. That means, in order to
implement cloud quantum computation, the user (who
acts as the client) is not required to buy new equip-
ments. We only need to manufacture one (or two) uni-
versal quantum computer(s) being used as the server (or
Server1, Server2), and set up a trusted center which can
prepare Bell states.
The role of the trusted center is very similar to the role
of certificate authority (CA) in public-key infrastructure
(PKI) [20]. In our protocols, the trusted center is needed
to prepare Bell states and change the positions of the par-
ticles. In addition, a private classical channel is necessary
between the client and the trusted center. Compared
with the triple-server protocol [14], the trusted center in
our protocols is more powerful. However, it is realizable
using current quantum technologies.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper reviews the BFK single-server and double-
server BQC protocols, the modified double-server pro-
tocol in Ref.[13] and the triple-server protocol. In these
double-server protocols, the client is completely classical,
but the servers are not allowed to communicate mutu-
ally. In the triple-server protocol, the servers are allowed
to communicate mutually, but the cost is higher and the
client must have the ability to access quantum channel.
Then we modify the double-server BQC protocols and
get a more practical protocol, in which the client is com-
pletely classical and the servers are allowed to communi-
cate mutually. We also point out that the double-server
protocol can be easily changed to be a single-server pro-
tocol without any loss of security.
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